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Abstract
We propose a novel approach to the well-studied problem of making
a finite, ordered sequence of decisions under uncertainty. Most existing
work in this area concentrates on graphical representations of decision
problems, and requires a complete specification of the problem. Our ap-
proach is based on a formal logic, such that the choice of an optimal
decision can be treated as a problem of logical deduction. The logical
formalism allows to leave unknown aspects of the problem unstated, and
it lends itself to various extensions that are difficult to incorporate into
graphical approaches. On the other hand, we can show that our formalism
can deduce at least the same consequences as are possible with the most
popular graphical approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
Decision making under uncertainty is a central topic of artificial intelligence,
and a number of approaches have been suggested to deal with it, some based
on logic (e.g. Boutilier, 1994), some on graphical representations like influence
diagrams (IDs, Howard and Matheson, 1981), some on Markov chains etc.
Our research in this area was initially motivated by our work in the CO-
DIO project on COllaborative Decision Support for Integrated Operations.1 As
part of that project, we developed a support system for operational decisions in
petroleum drilling using Bayesian networks (BN) modeling (Giese and Bratvold,
2010). One of the difficulties of the modelling endeavour was to elicit precise
quantitative assessments of probabilities and potential financial risks and bene-
fits. A BN model requires concrete numbers for every detail however, and there
is no way of saying, e.g., “we don’t know this probability” or “the expected
cost is between 1 MNOK and 3 MNOK.” Also other shortcomings of the BN
approach became evident from this application:
• time is an essential factor when dealing with operational decisions, and
BN technology offers only very limited support for temporal modelling.
∗Dept. of Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway
1Partially funded by the RCN Petromaks programme, 2007–2009.
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• In many cases, modeling with continuous values would have been more
natural than the discrete states imposed by BN technology.
• An essential aspect of the project was the differing knowledge of the in-
volved decision makers. It would have been useful to reason about which
knowledge needs to be available to which actor to arrive at the right de-
cision. Also this is far outside the scope of BN-based methods.
These observations prompted us to consider logic and logical deduction as a
basis for decision support. First, the semantics of a logic ensures that any
unknown information can simply be omitted. Nothing is ever deduced from
something that is not explicitly stated. Second, logics are known to be rel-
atively easy to combine. Although we have not done this yet, it is natural
to consider combinations of our approach with first-order logic (for reasoning
about continuous values), temporal logic, knowledge logic, etc. Additionally,
we consider the problem of a logical axiomatization of decision making to be an
interesting (theoretical) problem in its own right.
Our first contribution in this spirit was a probabilistic logic with conditional
independence formulae (Ivanovska and Giese, 2011) extending the probabilistic
logic of Fagin et al. (1990). Expressing (conditional) independence is a prereq-
uisite for a compact representation of probabilistic models, and one of the main
reasons for the success of Bayesian networks. We showed that similar compact-
ness and equivalent reasoning can be achieved with a purely logical notation.
That work was not concerned with decisions, but only with the modelling of
uncertainty.
The present paper extends our previous work by presenting a logic to describe
and reason about a fixed finite sequence of decisions under uncertainty with the
aim of maximizing the expected utility of the outcome.
The most closely related existing approach is that of Influence Diagrams
(IDs, Howard and Matheson, 1981), probably the most successful formalism for
modelling decision situations. We show that our logic, together with a suitable
calculus, allows to derive all conclusions that an ID model permits.
The paper is structured as follows: We introduce the syntax of the logic in
Sect. 2 and give the model semantics in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we briefly review
influence diagrams and show how a decision problem described as an ID can
be translated into a set of formulae of our logic. Sect. 5 gives an inference
system and states a partial completeness result. Sect. 6 reviews related work,
and Sect. 7 concludes the paper with some observations about future work.
2 SYNTAX
In general, we consider the scenario that a fixed, finite sequence of n decisions
has to be taken. Each of the decisions requires the decision maker to commit to
exactly one of a finite set of options. We can therefore represent the decisions
by a sequence A = (A1, . . . , An) of n finite sets that we call option sets. For
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instance, A = ({r1, r2}, {d1, d2}) represents a sequence of two decisions, each of
which requires to choose one of two options.
The consequences of the decisions taken depend partly on chance, and partly
on the state of the world. E.g. the result of drilling an oil well depends on the
success of the drilling operation (chance), and whether there actually is oil to
be found (state). We can encode the state of the world using a set of Boolean
variables P = {X1, X2, . . .}, which are traditionally called propositional letters
in formal logic.
Before each of the decisions is taken, some observations might be available
to guide the decision maker. These observations also depend on the state of
the world and an element of chance. E.g. a seismic test might be available
to judge the presence of oil before drilling, but it is not 100% reliable. Ob-
servations can also be represented by propositional letters by fixing a sequence
O = (O1, . . . , On) where each Ok ⊆ P is a set of observable propositional letters,
i.e. a set of letters whose value is known before taking the k-th decision. We
require this sequence to be monotonic, O1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ On, to reflect that every-
thing that can be observed before each decision, can be observed later. Later,
the semantics of expectation formulae (and the (EXP) rule based on it), will be
defined in a way that ensures that observations made before some decision, do
not change at later decisions, i.e. we model a ”non-forgetting decision maker.”
We call Ω = (P,A,O) a decision signature. In what follows we show how
we build our formulae over a given signature.
To express the element of chance in our logic, we follow the approach of Fagin
et al. (1990). They define a probabilistic propositional logic by augmenting
propositional logic with linear likelihood formulae
b1`(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bk`(ϕk) ≥ b,
where b1, . . . , bk, b are real numbers, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are pure propositional for-
mulae, i.e. formulae which do not themselves contain likelihood formulae. The
term `(ϕ) represents the probability of ϕ being true, and the language allows
expressing arbitrary linear relationships between such probabilities.
To be able to express probabilistic statements that depend on the decisions
that are taken, our logic uses likelihood terms indexed by sequences of options.
The intention is that these likelihood terms represent the likelihoods of propo-
sitional statements being true after some decision making (choosing of options)
has taken place. We define general likelihood terms and formulae with the
following definitions.
Definition 1 Given a sequence of option sets A = (A1, . . . , An) and a subse-
quence S = (Ai1 , . . . , Aik) for some 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ n, an S-option sequence
is a sequence σ = ai1 . . . aik with aij ∈ Aij for j = 1 . . . k. An A-option sequence
is also called a full option sequence.
In the following text, we will use σ to denote option sequences, and δ for full
option sequences.
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We introduce the likelihood term `δ(ϕ) to represent the likelihood of ϕ after
the options in δ (all decisions) have taken place. But sometimes the likelihood
of a statement does not depend on all the choices one makes, but just of a subset
of them, so we give a more general definition of a likelihood term and likelihood
formulae:
Definition 2 A general likelihood term is defined as:
`σ(ϕ),
where σ is an option sequence, and ϕ is a pure propositional formula. A linear
likelihood formula has the following form:
b1`σ1(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bk`σk(ϕk) ≥ b, (1)
where σ1, . . . , σk are S-option sequences for the same subsequence S of A,
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are pure propositional formulae, and b, b1, . . . , bk are real numbers.
A general likelihood term represents the likelihood (probability) of ϕ being
true, if the options in σ are chosen; the linear likelihood formula represents a
linear relationship between such likelihoods, and implies that that relationship
holds independently of the options taken for any decision not mentioned in the
σis. The definition is restricted to option sequences for the same sequence of op-
tion sets S, since it is unclear what meaning such formulae would have otherwise.
For instance, for A = ({r1, r2}, {d1, d2}), the formula 2`r1(ϕ1) + 0.5`r2(ϕ2) ≥ 2
is a well-formed likelihood formula; whilst 2`r1(ϕ1) + 0.5`r1d1(ϕ2) ≥ 2 is not.
We can also define conditional likelihood formulae as abbreviations, like
Halpern (2003) does:
`σ(ϕ|ψ) ≥ (≤)c iff `σ(ϕ ∧ ψ)− c`σ(ψ) ≥ (≤)0
where σ is an option sequence, and ϕ and ψ are pure propositional formulae.
`σ(ϕ|ψ) = c is defined as a conjunction of the corresponding two inequality
formulae.
To the language of propositional and linear likelihood formulae defined so
far we also add conditional independence formulae (CI-formulae) like the ones
proposed by Ivanovska and Giese (2011), but indexed with option sequences.
Their general form is the following:
Iσ(X1,X2|X3), (2)
where Xi, for i = 1, 2, 3 are sets of propositional letters, and σ is an option
sequence. It expresses that knowledge about the propositions in X2 does not add
knowledge about the propositions in X1 whenever the value of the propositions
in X3 is known and the options in σ are chosen.
Since our logic is intended to describe decision problems that contain an el-
ement of uncertainty, we follow the standard approach of decision theory, which
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is to model a rational decision maker as an expected utility maximizer. To rea-
son about the expected utility, we need to introduce a new kind of formulae.
Halpern (2003) shows how reasoning about the expected values of random vari-
ables can be included in a logic similarly to linear likelihood terms. We cannot
use this approach directly however, since we need to include (1) the possibility
to condition on observations made before taking decisions, and (2) the principle
of making utility maximizing decisions. On the other hand, we only need to
consider the expected value of one random variable, namely the utility.
For a full option sequence δ, we could introduce formulae of type eδ = c,
for a real number c, to represent the expected utility of taking the decisions
described by δ. But we are actually interested in representing expected utilities
conditional on some observations made before taking a decision. We therefore
use the more general form eδ(ϕ) = c to represent the expected utility conditional
on the observation ϕ.
In order to reason about the optimal choice after some, but not all of the
decisions have been made, this needs to be generalized further to the form
ea1...ak(ϕ) = c, which will express the expected utility, conditional on ϕ, after
the initial options a1 . . . ak have been chosen, assuming that all future choices
are made in such a way that the expected utility is maximized. Unfortunately,
it turns out to be difficult to define the semantics of such formulae for arbitrary
ϕ. To obtain a useful semantics, the formula ϕ that is conditioned upon has to
be required to be an “observable” formula.
Definition 3 Given a propositional letter X, an X-literal is either X or ¬X.
An S-atom for some set S ⊆ P is a conjunction of literals containing one
X-literal for each X ∈ S.
An expectation formula is a formula of type:
ea1...ak(ϕ) = c, (3)
where ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, . . . , k, ϕ is an Ok-atom, and c is a real number.
As stated before, the term on the left-hand side of (3) represents the expected
utility after committing to the options a1, . . . , ak, conditional on the observation
that ϕ is true, and then deciding upon the rest of the decisions represented by
the option sets Ak+1, . . . , An such that the expected utility is maximized.
We conclude this section with the following definition.
Definition 4 Let the decision signature Ω = (P,A,O) be given. The language
consisting of all of the propositional formulae, linear likelihood formulae type
(1), conditional-independence formulae type (2), expectation formulae type (3)
over the decision signature Ω, as well as any Boolean combination of the above,
will be denoted by L(Ω).
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3 SEMANTICS
In the previous section, we have defined the formulae of our logic, but we have
yet to give it a semantics that says whether some set of formulae is a consequence
of another.
In the following, we give a model semantics for our logic. It is built around
a notion of frames which capture the mathematical aspects of a decision situa-
tion independently of the logical language used to talk about it. These frames
are then extended to structures by adding an interpretation function for the
propositional letters.
Given any structure M and any formula f , we then go on to define whether
f is true in that particular structure. At the end of the current section, we will
see how this can be used to define a notion of logical consequence, and how this
ultimately can be used to make optimal decisions.
Definition 5 Let the sequence of n option sets A be given, and let ∆ be the set
of all full option sequences. A probabilistic decision frame (for reasoning about
n decisions) is a triple
(W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u)
where W is a set of worlds, µδ, for every δ ∈ ∆, is a probability measure on
2W , and u : W → R is a utility function.
To interpret linear likelihood formulae (1) and conditional independence (2)
formulae, we add an interpretation function to these frames. A further re-
striction will be needed for the interpretation of expectation formulae (3), see
Def. 11.
Definition 6 A probabilistic decision structure is a tuple
M = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u, pi)
where (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u) is a probabilistic decision frame, and pi is an interpre-
tation function which assigns to each element w ∈ W a truth-value function
piw : P→ {0, 1}.
The interpretation of the linear likelihood formulae (1) is defined in the
following way:
piw(b1`σ1(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bk`σk(ϕk) ≥ b) = 1 iff
b1µδ1(ϕ
M
1 ) + · · · + bkµδk(ϕMk ) ≥ b for every choice of full option
sequence δj , j = 1, . . . , k, satisfying the conditions:
• σj is a subsequence of δj ;
• if σj are S-option sequences, for a subsequence S of A, then all
δj agree on the options belonging to sets not in S.
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In other words, the linear relationship between the likelihoods has to hold in-
dependently of the choices made for any decisions not mentioned in the formula,
and which therefore are not contained in S.
Also note that the interpretation of likelihood formulae does not depend on
the state w, since statements about likelihood always refer to the entire set of
worlds rather than any particular one.
The interpretation of CI-formulae is defined by:





2 |XM3 ), where XMi := {XM | X ∈ Xi}, for every full
option sequence δ extending σ.
See e.g. Ivanovska and Giese (2011) for the definition of Iµ, which denotes
stochastic independence of two sets of events, conditional on a third set of events.
Before we can give the interpretation of the expectation formulae, we have
to define some semantic concepts within the probabilistic decision frames. We
start by recalling the definition of (conditional) expectation from probability
theory:
Definition 7 Let (W,F, µ) be a probability space, and X : W → R be a random
variable. The expected value of X (the expectation of X) with respect to the





For B ∈ F , such that µ(B) 6= 0, the conditional expectation of X with respect
to µ conditional on B is given by
Eµ(X|B) = Eµ|B(X).
This notion is sufficient to interpret the expectation formulae indexed by full
option sequences. Recall that they should express the expected utility condi-
tional on some formula, given one particular option for each of the decisions to
be taken. We define:
piw(eδ(ϕ) = c) = 1 iff µδ(ϕ
M ) = 0 or Eµδ(u|ϕM ) = c.
To be able to interpret general expectation formulae ea1...ak(ϕ) = c, where
only some initial number of options is fixed, we need to incorporate the idea that
the decision maker will pick the best (i.e. expected utility maximizing) option for
the remaining decisions. This is captured by the notion of optimal expected value
which is defined below. The definition relies on a notion of successively refined
observations, such that 1. the conditional expectations may only be conditional
on observed events, and 2. the probability of an observation is not influenced
by decisions taken after the observation. We give the formal definitions in what
follows:
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Definition 8 Given a set of worlds W , an event matrix of length n for W is a
sequence B = (B1, . . . , Bn) where each Bi ⊆ 2W is a partition of W , and Bi+1
is a refinement of Bi for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
The successive refinement captures the idea of an increasing amount of ob-
served information on a semantic level. To capture the fact that observations
are not influenced by future decisions, we require B to be regular with respect
to the frame F :
Definition 9 Given a frame F = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u), we call an event matrix
B = (B1, . . . , Bn) for W regular w.r.t. F if
µa1...ak−1ak...an(B) = µa1...ak−1a′k...a′n(B), (4)
for every k = 1, . . . , n, every B ∈ Bk, and for every ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, ..., n, and
a′i ∈ Ai, i = k, . . . , n.
If (4) holds, we can define new probability measures on Bk, for k = 1, . . . , n,
as restrictions:
µa1...ak−1(B) := µa1...ak−1ak...an(B), (5)
for every B ∈ Bk.
Definition 10 Let F = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u), be a probabilistic decision frame and
B = (B1, . . . , Bn) an event matrix for W that is regular w.r.t. F .
Now, the optimal expected value of the option sequence a1 . . . ak under an
event B ∈ Bk, with respect to F and B, is defined in the following recursive
way:
For k = n:
E¯F,Ba1...an(B) := Eµa1...an (u|B)








where µa1...ak , for every k = 0, . . . , n− 1 are the probability measures defined in
(5) above.
To complete this definition, we define the optimal expected value in the fol-
lowing special cases:
• If µa1...ak(B) = 0 then E¯F,Ba1...ak(B) is not defined and it doesn’t count in
(6);
• If Bk+1 = Bk then we have: E¯F,Ba1...ak(B) = maxa∈Ak+1{E¯F,Ba1...aka(B)}.
We now have the tools we need to give the interpretation of expectation
formulae.
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Lemma 1 For any decision signature (P,A,O) and any probabilistic decision
structure M , the sequence of sets OM (A) = (OM1 , . . . , O
M
n ), where
OMk := {ψM | ψ is an Ok-atom},
is an event matrix.
This is an immediate consequence of the nesting O1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ On of observable
propositional letters.
Definition 11 Let a decision signature (P,A,O) be given. Then a probabilistic
decision structure M = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u, pi) is called regular if OM (A) is a regular
event matrix for W .
We will from now on restrict our attention to regular structures only.
We interpret the expectation formulae in a regular structure M = (F, pi),
F = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u), in the following way:2
piw(ea1...ak(ϕ) = c) = 1 iff µa1...ak(ϕ
M ) = 0 or E¯F,O
M(A)
a1...ak
(ϕM ) = c.
This completes the model semantics for our logic. To summarize, we have
defined a notion of (regular probabilistic decision) structures, and shown how
the truth value of an arbitrary formula of our logic can be determined in any
such structure.
As usual in formal logic, we now define when a formula f is a logical con-
sequence of or entailed by some set of formulae Φ. Namely, this is the case if
every structure M that makes all formulae in Φ true, also makes f true. This
is written Φ |= f .
To see why this notion is sufficient for decision making, assume that we
have a decision situation for the decisions ({r1, r2}, {d1, d2}), specified by a
set of formulae Φ. Assume that r1 has already been chosen, and that some
observation B has been made before deciding between d1 or d2. If we can now
determine that
Φ |= er1d1(B) = 100 and Φ |= er1d2(B) = 150 ,
then we know that the expected utility of taking d2 is larger than that of d1,
and therefore d2 is the optimal decision in this case.
2The case with zero probability is similar to the corresponding case of conditional likelihood
formulae. Namely, in the latter case we also have `(ψ|ϕ) ≥ c vacuously true for any c, when
µ(ϕM ) = 0, i.e. when `(ϕ) = 0 is true. Whilst in the latter case it can be interpreted as
“when conditioning on impossible, anything is possible,” in the case of expectation formulae,
it can be read as “if we know something that is not possible, then we can expect anything.”
Note also that Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams exhibit the same behavior when
probabilities conditional to impossible events are given.
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4 INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS
Influence Diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 1981) are the most prominent for-
malism for representing and reasoning about fixed sequences of decisions. IDs
consist of a qualitative graph part, which is complemented by a set of tables
giving quantitative information about utilities and conditional probabilities. We
will show that our formalism allows to represent problems given as IDs as sets
of formulae, using a similar amount of space as required by the ID. In the next
section, we will give a calculus for our logic that allows to derive the same
statements about expected utilities as would be derived by reasoning on the ID.
The graph part of an ID is a directed acyclic graph in which three different
kinds of nodes can occur. The chance nodes (drawn as ovals) represent random
variables and are associated with the given conditional probability distributions.
Decision nodes (drawn as rectangles) represent the decisions to be taken. Value
nodes (drawn as diamonds) are associated with real-valued utility functions.
Arcs between decision nodes determine the order in which decisions are taken,
and arcs from chance nodes to decision nodes represent that the value of the
chance node is known (observed) when the decision is taken. Arcs into chance
and value nodes represent (probabilistic) dependency.
Example 1 Let us consider an influence diagram, which is an abstraction of




The situation modelled is that an oil wildcatter has to decide whether or not
to drill an exploration well. Before making that decision, he may or may not
perform a seismic test, which may give a better clue as to whether there is oil
to be found, but which also incurs an additional cost. In the diagram, R is
the decision whether to perform the test, which is followed by D, the decision
whether to drill. The seismic condition T is available as observation for D. The
presence of oil is represented by C, which is not directly observed, but which
has a probabilistic influence on the seismic condition T . The total utility is
determined by the presence of oil, whether a well is drilled, and whether the
test is performed.
For the remaining examples, we will work with the following concrete prob-
abilities p(C) = 0.8, p(T |C, r1) = 0.3, p(T |¬C, r1) = 0.9, p(T |C, r2) = 0.4,
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p(T |¬C, r2) = 0.2 3; and utilities: U(r1, d1, C) = 10, U(r1, d1,¬C) = 7,
U(r1, d2, (¬)C) = 9, U(r2, di, C) = 11, U(r2, di, (¬)C) = 8.
An influence diagram is said to be regular (Schachter, 1986) if there is a path
from each decision node to the next one. It is no-forgetting if each decision has
an arc from any chance node that has an arc to a previous decision. If all the
chance nodes of an influence diagram represent binary variables, then we call
it a binary influence diagram. We can identify a binary chance node X with a
propositional letter and denote its two states by ¬X and X. We consider here
only binary, regular and no-forgetting influence diagrams with only one value
node. 4
We denote the set of parent nodes of a node X by Pa(X) and the set of non-
descendants with ND(X). If we want to single out parents or non-descendants
of a certain type, we use a corresponding subscript, for example with Pa◦(X)
we denote the set of all parent nodes of a node X that are chance nodes, and
the set of all parent nodes of X that are decision nodes we denote by Pa2(X).
We can use the formulae of the logical language defined in Sec. 2 to encode
influence diagrams. In what follows we explain how we do the encoding.
In influence diagrams, the utility function can depend directly on some of
the decisions and some of the chance variables. In order to achieve the same
compactness of representation as in an ID, we would have to represent that the
utility is (conditionally) independent on all other nodes. It turns out that this
is not quite possible in our formalism. We can however represent independence
on those chance nodes which are never observed.
In order to express the utility dependent on some state ϕ of the chance
nodes using an expectation formula e...(ϕ) = c of our logic, ϕ has to be an
observable. But typically, the utility will depend on some non-observable nodes.
We address this by using an option set sequence A which contains, in addition
to one element for each decision node in the ID, a final “dummy” option set
with only one element, written U = {3}. OU will be the last element of the
monotonic sequence of other sets of observables, with OU \ On being a set of
propositional letters that represent the chance variables (facts) that have an arc
into the utility node.
Example 2 The decision problem given by the influence diagram in Example 1
can be represented by the following set of formulae over the decision signature
Ω1 = ({T,C}, (R,D,U), (∅, {T}, {T,C})):
`λ(C) = 0.8, `r1(T |C) = 0.3, `r1(T |¬C) = 0.9,
`r2(T |C) = 0.4, `r2(T |¬C) = 0.2,
3The probabilities differ dependent on the options chosen. We write this using “condition-
ing” on those options.
4The restriction to binary nodes is not essential: it is possible to encode nodes with more
states by using several propositional letters per node. It would also be straightforward to
extend our logic to represent several utility nodes. It may be possible to extend our framework
to allow dropping the regularity and no-forgetting conditions, but we have not investigated
this yet.
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where λ is the empty option sequence, and
er1d13(C ∧ ϕ) = 10, er1d13(¬C ∧ ϕ) = 7, er1d23((¬)C ∧ ϕ) = 9,
er2di3(C ∧ ϕ) = 11, er2di3((¬)C ∧ ϕ) = 8,
for ϕ ∈ {T,¬T}. /
In general, we encode an influence diagram with a set of formulae that we
call its specific axioms:
Definition 12 Let an influence diagram I with n decision nodes be given. We
define the decision signature ΩI = (P,AI ,OI), where AI is the sequence of
option sets determined by the decision nodes and the utility node of I, i.e. AI =
(A1, . . . , An, U), U = {3}, and OI = (O1, . . . , On, OU ) is such that Oi =
Pa◦(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Pa◦(Ai), for every i = 1, . . . , n, and OU = On ∪ Pa◦(U).
The set of specific axioms of I, Ax(I), is a set of formulae of the language
L(ΩI) consisting of the following formulae:
• `σ(X|ϕ) = c, for every chance node X, every Pa◦(X)-atom ϕ, and every
Pa2(X)-option sequence σ, where c = p(X|ϕ, σ)
• Iλ(X,ND◦(X)|Pa◦(X)), for every chance node X;
• eσ3(ϕ ∧ ψ) = b, for every (A1, . . . , An)-option sequence σ and every
Pa◦(U)-atom ϕ, where b = U(ϕ, σ) and ψ is any On-atom.
5 AXIOMS AND INFERENCE RULES
While Sect. 3 defines entailment in terms of the model semantics, it does not say
how entailment may be checked algorithmically. In this section we present an
inference system i.e. a set of universally valid formulae (axioms) and inference
rules that allow to infer more valid formulae that are entailed by a given set of
formulae. The set of reasoning rules allows to infer the entailment of statements
of the kind needed for decision making, at least to the same extent as that
supported by influence diagrams.
For propositional reasoning, reasoning about likelihood and reasoning about
inequalities, we have the following axiomatic schemes and rules adapted from
the ones given by Fagin et al. (1990) and Ivanovska and Giese (2011):
Prop All the substitution instances of tautologies in propositional logic,
QU1 `σ(ϕ) ≥ 0
QU2 `σ(>) = 1
QU3 `σ(ϕ) = `σ(ϕ ∧ ψ) + `σ(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), for every pure prop. formulae ϕ and ψ.
Ineq All substitution instances of valid linear inequality formulae,
MP From f and f ⇒ g infer g for any formulae f , g.
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QUGen From ϕ ⇔ ψ infer `σ(ϕ) = `σ(ψ), for every pure prop. formulae ϕ
and ψ.
SYM From Iσ(X1,X2|X3) infer Iσ(X2,X1|X3).
DEC From Iσ(X1,X2 ∪X3|X4) infer Iσ(X1,X2|X4).
IND From Iσ(X1,X2|X3) and `σ(ϕ1|ϕ3) ≤ (≥)a infer `σ(ϕ1|ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3) ≤ (≥)a,
where ϕi is an arbitrary Xi-atom, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
We add the following new rules for reasoning about preservation of likelihood
and independence, and about expected utilities.
PP From `σ(ϕ|ψ) = b infer `σ′(ϕ|ψ) = b, for every option sequence σ′ contain-
ing σ.5
PI From Iσ(X1,X2|X3) infer Iσ′(X1,X2|X3), for every option sequence σ′ con-
taining σ.
EXP Let ψ be an Ok-atom and {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} be the set of all Ok+1-atoms,
such that ψ is a sub-atom of ϕi, i = 1, . . . ,m. From ea1...aka(ϕi) = bi,a,
for every a ∈ Ak+1, and bi = maxa{bi,a}, for every i = 1, . . . ,m, and
b1`a1...ak(ϕ1)+ · · ·+bm`a1...ak(ϕm)−b`a1...ak(ψ) = 0, infer ea1...ak(ψ) = b.
The soundness of the given axioms and rules mostly follows easily from the
semantics. We give a proof of soundness for the EXP rule:
Let (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u, pi) be a regular structure with frame F = (W, (µδ)δ∈∆, u)
in which the following formulae are valid:
• ea1...aka(ϕi) = bi,a, for every i = 1, . . . ,m, and for every a ∈ Ak+1, where
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is the set of all Ok+1-atoms such that ψ is a subatom of ϕi,
i = 1, . . . ,m;
• b1`a1...ak(ϕ1)+· · ·+bm`a1...ak(ϕm)−b`a1...ak(ψ) = 0, where bi = maxa{bi,a},
for every i = 1, . . . ,m.
Hence we have:




i ) = bi,a . . . (*) for every i = 1, . . . ,m,
and for every a ∈ Ak+1
• b1µa1...akσ(ϕM1 ) + · · ·+ bmµa1...akσ(ϕMm ) = bµa1...akσ(ψM ) . . . . . . . . . . . (**)
for every (Ak+1, . . . , An)-option sequence σ, where bi = maxa{bi,a}, for
every i = 1, . . . ,m.
5This rule can be extended to arbitrary linear likelihood formulae, if care is taken to extend
all occurring option sequences by the same additional options.
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i |ψM ) max
a∈Ak+1
{E¯F,OM(A)a1...aka (ϕMi )} (6’)
Then, using (5) we obtain:
µa1...akσ(ϕ
M
i ) = µa1...ak(ϕ
M
i ),
for every i = 1, . . . ,m, where σ is as described above.
This, together with (**) leads to the following equality:
b1µa1...ak(ϕ
M
1 ) + · · ·+ bmµa1...ak(ϕMm ) = bµa1...ak(ψM ).










{E¯F,OM(A)a1...aka (ϕMi )} (7)
(If µa1...aka(ϕ
M





i ) is not defined and not counted in the last equality.)
If we compare this with (6’), in the case of µa1...ak(ψ




(ψM ) = b,
i.e. ea1...ak(ψ) = b is valid in M .
If µa1...ak(ψ
M ) = 0, then ea1...ak(ψ) = b is vacuously true.
Example 3 We can use this calculus to derive some conclusions about the
influence diagram given in Example 1, and axiomatized in Example 2. If we
want to determine the expected utility of taking the option r1, er1(>), we can
use the following derivation:
1. er1d13(C ∧ T ) = 10, er1d13(¬C ∧ T ) = 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (premises)
2. `r1(C) = 0.8, `r1(T |C) = 0.3, `r1(T |¬C) = 0.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (premises and PP)
3. `r1(¬C) = 0.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,(QU3)
4. `r1(C ∧ T ) = 0.24, `r1(¬C ∧ T ) = 0.18 . . . . . (2, 3, def of cond. likelihood, Ineq)
5. `r1(T ) = 0.42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 and (QU3)
6. `r1(¬T ) = 0.58. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 and (QU3)
7. `r1(C ∧ ¬T ) = 0.56. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2, 4, (QU3)
8. `r1d1(C ∧ T ) = 0.24, `r1d1(¬C ∧ T ) = 0.18, `r1d1(T ) = 0.42 . . . . (4, 6, and PP)
9. 10`r1d1(C∧T )+7`r1d1(¬C∧T )− ((10 ·0.24+7 ·0.18)/0.42)`r1d1(T ) = 0(8,Ineq)
10. er1d1(T ) = 8.71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (9, Prop, and EXP 2)
11. er1d2(T ) = 9, er1d1(¬T ) = 9.90, er1d2(¬T ) = 9 . . (obtained similarly to step 10)
12. `r1(>) = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (QU2, PP)
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13. 9`r1(T ) + 9.90`r1(¬T )− (9 · 0.42 + 9.90 · 0.58)`r1(>) = 0 . . (5,6,11,12 and Ineq)
14. er1(>) = 6.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (13,Prop, and EXP 2) /
The given calculus is not complete in general, i.e. there are sets of formulas
Φ which entail some formula f , but the calculus does not allow to derive f from
Φ. This is in part due to the fact that complete reasoning about independence
requires reasoning about polynomial and not just linear inequalities. But the
terms bi`a1...ak(ϕi) in the EXP rule indicate that polynomial inequality reason-
ing is also required in general to reason about conditional expectation, when no
concrete values for the bi can be derived.
We can however prove the following restricted completeness theorem for
entailments corresponding to those possible with an ID.
Theorem 1 Let I be a given influence diagram with n decision nodes and Ax(I)
its set of specific axioms. Then for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every (A1, . . . , Ak)-
option sequence a1 . . . ak, and every Ok-atom ψ, then there is a real number b
such that
Ax (I) ` ea1...ak(ψ) = b .
Proof: We use a backward induction on the length of the option sequence k.
For k = n, let a1 . . . an be a fixed (A1, . . . , An)-option sequence and ψ be an
On-atom. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕm be all of the OU -atoms that contain ψ as a subatom.
Then Ax(I) contains the formulae ea1...an3(ϕi) = bi, for some real numbers bi,
i = 1, . . . ,m. And we have the following derivation steps:
1. ea1...an3(ϕi) = bi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (premise)(for i = 1, . . . ,m)
2. bi = max{bi} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Ineq)(for i = 1, . . . ,m)
3. `a1...an(ϕi) = ci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Q1-Q3, PP)(for i = 1, . . . ,m)
4. `a1...an(ψ) = c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Q1-Q3, PP)
Depending on c we then have the following two groups of possible final steps of
this derivation:
For c 6= 0:
5. b1`a1...an(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bm`a1...an(ϕm)− (b1c1 + · · ·+ bmcm)/c`a1...an(ψ) = 0
(3, 4,and Ineq)
6. ea1...an(ψ) = (b1c1 + · · ·+ bmcm)/c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1,2,5 and EXP2)
For c = 0:
5’. ci = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3, 4, QU3)(for i = 1, . . . ,m)
6’. b1`a1...an(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bm`a1...an(ϕm)− b`a1...an(ψ) = 0 . . . (4, 5’ and Ineq)
7’. ea1...an(ψ) = b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (6’ and EXP 2)
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where b is any real number.
For k < n, let us suppose that the assumption holds for every k + 1, . . . , n.
Let a1, . . . , ak be an arbitrary option sequence such that ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, . . . , k
and ψ be an arbitrary Ok-atom. Let {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} be the set of all Ok+1-atoms
such that ψ is a subatom of ϕi, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then we have the following
derivation steps:
1. ea1...aka(ϕi) = bi,a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (IS) (for i = 1, . . . ,m, a ∈ Ak+1)
2. bi = maxa{bi,a} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Ineq)(for i = 1, . . . ,m)
And then we proceed with steps similar to those in the case k = n.
From soundness, and an inspection of the axiomatization Ax(I), we can
conclude that the value b must clearly be the same as what would be derived
from the ID.
6 Related Work
In our logic, all likelihoods are conceptually indexed by full option sequences,
although the formalism allows writing only a subset of the options in formulae.
It is tempting to try to reduce the conceptual complexity of the formalism by
using propositions to represent the decisions. This has been suggested already
by Jeffrey (1965), and is taken up e.g. by Bacchus and Grove (1996). However,
it requires keeping track of “controlled” versus “non-controlled” variables, and
some mechanism is needed to express preference of one option over another. It
also gives no immediate solution for the description of observations, and there
is an issue with frame axioms. Ultimately, keeping decisions separate from
propositions seems to lead to a simpler framework.
Another related line of work in this direction is based on Markov decision
processes (MDPs). A MDP is a complete specification of a stochastic process
influenced by actions and with a “reward function” that accumulates over time.
In contrast to our formalism, MDPs can accommodate unbounded sequences of
decisions. Kwiatkowska (2003) has investigated model checking of formulae in a
probabilistic branching time logic over MDPs. Our approach is not as general,
but significantly simpler. We also describe the decision problem itself by a set of
formulae and reason about entailment instead of model checking. This can be
an advantage in particular if complete information about the decision problem
is not available.
Another approach that embeds actions into the logical formalism is the sit-
uation calculus, a probabilistic version of which has been described by Mateus
et al. (2001). This is a very general approach, but the situation calculus is
based on second-order logic. Our approach is based on propositional logic, and
is therefore conceptually simpler, although it is less general.
We should also point out that our formalism allows more compact represen-
tation than most other logic-based approaches, since, similar to IDs, it gives the
possibility of expressing independence on both uncertainties and decisions.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have argued how a logic-based approach can have advantages over the more
common graphical approaches, in particular when combined with elicitation
problems, and in combination with reasoning about time, knowledge, continuous
values, etc.
As a possible basis for such a logic-based approach, we have described a
propositional logic designed to specify a fixed, finite sequence of decisions, to
be taken with the aim of maximizing expected utility. Our approach is to let
each complete sequence of actions impose a separate probability measure on a
common set of worlds equipped with a utility function. The formulae of the logic
may refer to only a subset of the decisions, which allows for a more compact
representation in the presence of independencies. We have shown how influence
diagrams can be mapped into our logic, and we have given a calculus which
is complete for the type of inferences possible with IDs. A step towards going
beyond IDs would be to extend the current framework by allowing expectation
formulae with inequalities with the obvious semantics, which would provide a
representation equivalent to a “credal influence diagram”(an analog of a credal
network).
We consider the main appeal of our logic over other logic-based approaches
to be its relative simplicity: it incorporates reasoning about multiple decisions,
observations, and independence, with a fairly straightforward model semantics,
no need for frame axioms, and a rather small inference system.
The presented logic is intended as a basis for treating more general prob-
lems, rather than treating the known ones more efficiently. In future work, we
will consider the effect of including polynomial and not only linear inequality
reasoning. This should make it possible to design a calculus that is complete for
arbitrary entailment between formulae as given in this paper, and also exten-
sions allowing e.g. comparisons between different expected utility terms. This
will put reasoning in the style of “qualitative influence diagrams” (Renooij and
van der Gaag, 1998) within the range of our framework. We will also investigate
improved ways of expressing utilities to make better use of independence of the
utility of arbitrary decisions and propositional letters.
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